This research investigates the impact of Key Audit Matters (KAM) on financial information quality in Tunisian firms. For this reason, we use 52 Tunisian firms for the period 2017-2020. Our GLS and GMM regressions indicate that, in agreement with the agency theory, external auditor has an effective role, as an instrument of monitoring, to prohibit the opportunistic activities of managers. It supervises the manager’s behavior by the disclosure of KAM. Hence, it serves as a crucial tool that contributes to improve financial information quality and to decrease information asymmetry. In addition, it is considered as an important mechanism for preserving trust in financial reporting and integrity of financial information. This study is important for potential investors who should assess KAM when evaluating firms. Furthermore, our results will be useful to companies because they provide evidence that the external auditor can effectively reduce managerial opportunistic behavior and enhance information quality. Finally, they could encourage audit regulators to ameliorate the audit standards.
Published in | International Journal of Accounting, Finance and Risk Management (Volume 7, Issue 4) |
DOI | 10.11648/j.ijafrm.20220704.12 |
Page(s) | 150-156 |
Creative Commons |
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited. |
Copyright |
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Science Publishing Group |
Key Audit Matters (KAM), Information Quality, Tunisian Firms, Generalized Last Squares
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APA Style
Khawla Hlel, Ines Kahloul Nafti. (2022). The Effect of Key Audit Matters on Financial Information Quality: The Case of Tunisia. International Journal of Accounting, Finance and Risk Management, 7(4), 150-156. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijafrm.20220704.12
ACS Style
Khawla Hlel; Ines Kahloul Nafti. The Effect of Key Audit Matters on Financial Information Quality: The Case of Tunisia. Int. J. Account. Finance Risk Manag. 2022, 7(4), 150-156. doi: 10.11648/j.ijafrm.20220704.12
@article{10.11648/j.ijafrm.20220704.12, author = {Khawla Hlel and Ines Kahloul Nafti}, title = {The Effect of Key Audit Matters on Financial Information Quality: The Case of Tunisia}, journal = {International Journal of Accounting, Finance and Risk Management}, volume = {7}, number = {4}, pages = {150-156}, doi = {10.11648/j.ijafrm.20220704.12}, url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijafrm.20220704.12}, eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ijafrm.20220704.12}, abstract = {This research investigates the impact of Key Audit Matters (KAM) on financial information quality in Tunisian firms. For this reason, we use 52 Tunisian firms for the period 2017-2020. Our GLS and GMM regressions indicate that, in agreement with the agency theory, external auditor has an effective role, as an instrument of monitoring, to prohibit the opportunistic activities of managers. It supervises the manager’s behavior by the disclosure of KAM. Hence, it serves as a crucial tool that contributes to improve financial information quality and to decrease information asymmetry. In addition, it is considered as an important mechanism for preserving trust in financial reporting and integrity of financial information. This study is important for potential investors who should assess KAM when evaluating firms. Furthermore, our results will be useful to companies because they provide evidence that the external auditor can effectively reduce managerial opportunistic behavior and enhance information quality. Finally, they could encourage audit regulators to ameliorate the audit standards.}, year = {2022} }
TY - JOUR T1 - The Effect of Key Audit Matters on Financial Information Quality: The Case of Tunisia AU - Khawla Hlel AU - Ines Kahloul Nafti Y1 - 2022/10/29 PY - 2022 N1 - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijafrm.20220704.12 DO - 10.11648/j.ijafrm.20220704.12 T2 - International Journal of Accounting, Finance and Risk Management JF - International Journal of Accounting, Finance and Risk Management JO - International Journal of Accounting, Finance and Risk Management SP - 150 EP - 156 PB - Science Publishing Group SN - 2578-9376 UR - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijafrm.20220704.12 AB - This research investigates the impact of Key Audit Matters (KAM) on financial information quality in Tunisian firms. For this reason, we use 52 Tunisian firms for the period 2017-2020. Our GLS and GMM regressions indicate that, in agreement with the agency theory, external auditor has an effective role, as an instrument of monitoring, to prohibit the opportunistic activities of managers. It supervises the manager’s behavior by the disclosure of KAM. Hence, it serves as a crucial tool that contributes to improve financial information quality and to decrease information asymmetry. In addition, it is considered as an important mechanism for preserving trust in financial reporting and integrity of financial information. This study is important for potential investors who should assess KAM when evaluating firms. Furthermore, our results will be useful to companies because they provide evidence that the external auditor can effectively reduce managerial opportunistic behavior and enhance information quality. Finally, they could encourage audit regulators to ameliorate the audit standards. VL - 7 IS - 4 ER -