This paper determines management behaviour for Tunisian banking industry between 1989 and 2006. Following the Granger causality, we examine the intertemporal relationships between bank efficiency, loan loss provision and capitalisation. The possible relationships between the variables imply different modes of management behaviour namely bad management, bad luck, skimping, and moral hazard behaviour. We extend the Granger causality model developed by Berger and DeYoung (1997) by applying G.M.M dynamic panel estimators on a panel of Tunisian commercial banks. The econometric results suggest that the intertemporal relationships between the loan loss provision and productive efficiency are checked in only one direction. Our data provide evidence for the bad luck hypothesis suggesting the exogeneity of bad loans triggering inefficiency. In addition, we find no evidence of bad management hypothesis for the Tunisian commercial banks. Thus, these banks adopted a skimping behaviour over 1989-2006 period. Finally, the moral hazard behaviour, according to which the managers of the thinly capitalised banks assume additional portfolio risk, was identified in the context of the Tunisian banks.
Published in | International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences (Volume 1, Issue 6) |
DOI | 10.11648/j.ijefm.20130106.21 |
Page(s) | 335-346 |
Creative Commons |
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited. |
Copyright |
Copyright © The Author(s), 2013. Published by Science Publishing Group |
Cost/Profit Efficiency, Granger Causality, Stochastic Frontier Analysis, Managerial Behavior
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APA Style
ZAGHLA Abdessalem, BOUJELBENE Younes. (2013). Determinants of Managerial Behaviour in the Tunisian Banking Industry. International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences, 1(6), 335-346. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijefm.20130106.21
ACS Style
ZAGHLA Abdessalem; BOUJELBENE Younes. Determinants of Managerial Behaviour in the Tunisian Banking Industry. Int. J. Econ. Finance Manag. Sci. 2013, 1(6), 335-346. doi: 10.11648/j.ijefm.20130106.21
AMA Style
ZAGHLA Abdessalem, BOUJELBENE Younes. Determinants of Managerial Behaviour in the Tunisian Banking Industry. Int J Econ Finance Manag Sci. 2013;1(6):335-346. doi: 10.11648/j.ijefm.20130106.21
@article{10.11648/j.ijefm.20130106.21, author = {ZAGHLA Abdessalem and BOUJELBENE Younes}, title = {Determinants of Managerial Behaviour in the Tunisian Banking Industry}, journal = {International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences}, volume = {1}, number = {6}, pages = {335-346}, doi = {10.11648/j.ijefm.20130106.21}, url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijefm.20130106.21}, eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ijefm.20130106.21}, abstract = {This paper determines management behaviour for Tunisian banking industry between 1989 and 2006. Following the Granger causality, we examine the intertemporal relationships between bank efficiency, loan loss provision and capitalisation. The possible relationships between the variables imply different modes of management behaviour namely bad management, bad luck, skimping, and moral hazard behaviour. We extend the Granger causality model developed by Berger and DeYoung (1997) by applying G.M.M dynamic panel estimators on a panel of Tunisian commercial banks. The econometric results suggest that the intertemporal relationships between the loan loss provision and productive efficiency are checked in only one direction. Our data provide evidence for the bad luck hypothesis suggesting the exogeneity of bad loans triggering inefficiency. In addition, we find no evidence of bad management hypothesis for the Tunisian commercial banks. Thus, these banks adopted a skimping behaviour over 1989-2006 period. Finally, the moral hazard behaviour, according to which the managers of the thinly capitalised banks assume additional portfolio risk, was identified in the context of the Tunisian banks.}, year = {2013} }
TY - JOUR T1 - Determinants of Managerial Behaviour in the Tunisian Banking Industry AU - ZAGHLA Abdessalem AU - BOUJELBENE Younes Y1 - 2013/11/20 PY - 2013 N1 - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijefm.20130106.21 DO - 10.11648/j.ijefm.20130106.21 T2 - International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences JF - International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences JO - International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences SP - 335 EP - 346 PB - Science Publishing Group SN - 2326-9561 UR - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijefm.20130106.21 AB - This paper determines management behaviour for Tunisian banking industry between 1989 and 2006. Following the Granger causality, we examine the intertemporal relationships between bank efficiency, loan loss provision and capitalisation. The possible relationships between the variables imply different modes of management behaviour namely bad management, bad luck, skimping, and moral hazard behaviour. We extend the Granger causality model developed by Berger and DeYoung (1997) by applying G.M.M dynamic panel estimators on a panel of Tunisian commercial banks. The econometric results suggest that the intertemporal relationships between the loan loss provision and productive efficiency are checked in only one direction. Our data provide evidence for the bad luck hypothesis suggesting the exogeneity of bad loans triggering inefficiency. In addition, we find no evidence of bad management hypothesis for the Tunisian commercial banks. Thus, these banks adopted a skimping behaviour over 1989-2006 period. Finally, the moral hazard behaviour, according to which the managers of the thinly capitalised banks assume additional portfolio risk, was identified in the context of the Tunisian banks. VL - 1 IS - 6 ER -